Published Articles
Goyal, Samiksha. 2024. “Approaching Gandhian Metaethics: Some methodological issues.” In History of Indian Ethics: Gender, Justice, Ecology, edited by Purushottam Bilimoria and Amy Rayner. Routledge. 444-534.
Goyal, Samiksha. 2022. “Gandhi and Moral Agency: A Study of Political Literature.” In APA Studies, Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies, edited by Douglas Allen, Yarran Hominh, and Minh Nguyen 22, no. 1(Special issue on The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi): 15-20.
Mukherji, Nirmalangshu and Samiksha Goyal. 2022. “Gandhi’s Moral Agents.” Economic and Political Weekly LVII, no.13: 70-76.
Goyal, Samiksha and Nirmalangshu Mukherji. 2020. “Gandhi and Saintliness.” Economic and Political Weekly LV, no. 36: 49-55. Download.
Goyal, Samiksha. 2020. “Gandhi: Philosopher or Pragmatic Politician? Gandhi Against Caste by Nishikant Kolge, Oxford University Press 2017; Total Pages 316; ISBN 13: 978-0-19-947429-5 (Hardcover) Price 695 INR.” Journal of Dharma Studies 3: 197-206. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-019-00045-y
Manuscripts in preparation
“Detachment as an intellectual virtue”
One is hard pressed to find an account of detachment in the contemporary virtue theory literature either moral or epistemological. This paper develops an account of detachment as a non possessive perspective, and explains how detachment supports one of the fundamental aims of virtue epistemology, that is, for an agent to become a responsible and effective inquirer.
“Gandhi and Berlin on Value Pluralism” (with Joe Campbell)
In this essay we explore how Mohandas Gandhi might respond to Isaiah Berlin’s criticisms of value monism. Berlin’s view of monism is part of an extended critique of systematic theories we call value rationalism. We isolate two of Berlin’s reasons for why he sides in favour of pluralism as against value monism and explain how Gandhi addresses these worries despite his monistic commitments. First, Berlin takes conflict of values as a basis for pluralism of values. We argue that Gandhi manages value conflicts with his notion of non-violence. Gandhi promotes tolerance and co-existence of differing values without concluding pluralism. Second, Berlin wants to secure individual freedom–especially what he calls ‘positive liberty’ (freedom to)–against predeterminism. We explain that epistemologically Gandhi adopts a perspectival notion of arriving at value along with prima facie monism. Gandhi secures individual freedom with the perspectival notion in terms of his swarāj which we explain as response and resistance.
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